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How can EU decision-making be brought closer to Europe’s citizens? Based on a case study of the
‘REACH’ regulation governing the production and use of chemical substances, Karl-Oskar
Lindgren writes on the potential for a participatory governance approach to increase the EU’s
legitimacy by enhancing the capacity for stakeholders and civil society actors to play an active role
in decisions. He argues that while participatory governance alone cannot solve the EU’s current
legitimacy crisis, it nevertheless oﬀers a realistic option for increasing the responsiveness of EU
decision-making to the demands of citizens.
The EU is often accused of suﬀering from a democratic deﬁcit, and there has been a long search for ways to remedy
this situation. Acknowledging the weakness of traditional representative channels in the EU, and the diﬃcult road
ahead before any form of ‘parliamentarisation’ could be accomplished, many observers have recently shifted their
attention to the direct involvement of civil society in the European political system. Letting stakeholders and civil
society take an active part in policy-making is considered by many to oﬀer a promising complement to more
traditional forms of democracy. In EU circles this strategy is known as the participatory governance approach.
Participatory governance in the EU
The European Commission has been a leading proponent of this participatory turn, and in the last decade it has
introduced a range of instruments for improved consultation and dialogue with civil-society representatives, including
ad hoc and online consultations, public hearings, and institutionalised consultations in advisory committees and
business test panels.
According to the Commission, introducing these new forums for interest-group participation and deliberation at the
EU level will help create a more democratic and eﬀective Union. However, critics of the participatory governance
approach warn that strengthening the interest-based channel within the Union will mainly serve to give further
advantages to already privileged groups. The danger here is that, as E.E Schattschneider famously noted half a
century ago in his critique of interest-group pluralism, ‘the ﬂaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus
sings with a strong upper class accent’.
In a book focused on participatory governance in the EU, written together with a colleague of mine, I have subjected
these opposing claims to empirical examination. More precisely, we focused on the large overhaul of the Union’s
chemicals policy, in which the so-called REACH system was introduced. An important reason for focusing on this
particular policy process was that it has been described as a ‘blue print for participatory law-making’.
Taken together, the results presented in the book paint a rather positive picture of the governance experiment
conducted in the REACH case. Overall, the REACH process proved to be reasonably open and inclusive, and most
of the relevant actors had at least some opportunity to make their voice heard and to inﬂuence the outcome.
Moreover, contrary to the fears expressed by critics of the participatory governance approach, we found no dramatic
inequality among actors in the distribution of inﬂuence or in access to information. Based on these results we argued
that critics of the Commission’s new governance strategy may have downplayed the potential contribution to
democratic representation of stakeholder participation and deliberation, and exaggerated the risks entailed in a
closer involvement of organised civil society in EU decision-making.
Admittedly, it is unlikely that the participatory-governance model will provide all interest groups with equal chances
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of making their voice heard and of inﬂuencing political
outcomes. Dismissing the model on these grounds,
however, is to commit the Nirvana fallacy: comparing
an existing reality with an unobtainable ideal. The fact
that political power is always, to some extent,
unequally distributed is one of the few general laws of
social science. The relevant question, therefore, is
not whether participatory governance provides a
complete level playing ﬁeld between diﬀerent groups
and interests, but whether the bias in favour of
resource-rich actors is suﬃciently great as to nullify
the democratic beneﬁts associated with stakeholder
participation and deliberation.
This does not mean, however, that we see
participatory governance as a panacea for the
legitimacy problems of the Union. We do not. Most
importantly, it is a problem that the new governance
arrangements typically include no formal mechanisms
for holding policy-makers accountable. It remains the case, then, that those wielding power can only be held
accountable through the traditional representative channels of the Union: that is, the Council and the Parliament.
Moreover, the introduction of the new arrangements may have the eﬀect of diﬀusing responsibility for policy – with
stakeholders and interest groups engaging more deeply in policy-making, even as European citizens lack any
formal way to hold them to account. The danger of diﬀused responsibility is that it may tempt decision-makers to
play a blame-and-shame game, wherein they try to evade responsibility for policy mistakes by blaming others.
It should also be acknowledged that strengthening the interest-based channel within the EU could have detrimental
eﬀects on the functioning of the territorial and electoral channels of representation within the Union. For instance, a
greater reliance on participatory and deliberative arrangements could have the eﬀect over the long run of
undermining already existing aspects of representative democracy in the Union. Fewer people will be expected,
perhaps, to engage in political parties and representative institutions when they have other organisations at their
disposal.
If citizens are engaged more and more in single-issue movements and special-interest organisations, we risk a
situation in which it will be hard to ﬁnd people who are willing to take responsibility for weighing diﬀerent interests
against one another. In the end, someone has to take responsibility for the totality of policies pursued – not just the
constituent parts thereof. This is a major challenge for democracy, in the EU and elsewhere. The danger, then, is
that the existing embryo of representative democracy in the Union may be put at a disadvantage when participatory
and deliberative arrangements are on the rise.
However, as long as the participatory-governance model is used with care, it can provide – as the case of REACH
shows – an important means for helping connect the Union more closely to its citizens. Participatory governance
may not be a complete solution to the EU’s legitimacy crisis, but proper use of it can help reduce the breadth and
depth of this crisis. In our view, the ongoing attempts to involve stakeholders and interest groups in EU decision-
making oﬀer a promising way forward. The main alternative would be to institute a more closed and secretive
decision-making process unresponsive to the demands of European citizens – which is surely not an approach likely
to enhance the legitimacy of the Union.
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